The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model [Audiobook] download free by Jean Jacques Laffont

The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model Audiobook download free by Jean Jacques Laffont
  • Listen audiobook: The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
  • Author: Jean Jacques Laffont
  • Release date: 2011/7/25
  • Publisher: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • Language: English
  • Genre or Collection: Business, Finance and Law
  • ISBN: 9780691091846
  • Rating: 8.11 of 10
  • Votes: 585
  • Review by: Noor Lowry
  • Review rating: 8.15 of 10
  • Review Date: 2018/9/29
  • Duration: 5H27M6S in 256 kbps (88 MB)
  • Date of creation of the audiobook: 2018-07-06
  • You can listen to this audiobook in formats: MP3, MP4, WMA, FLAC, WAV, MPC, ATRAC, MPEG4 (compression RAR, CPIO, TAR.LZO, CHM, RPM, ZIP, JAR)
  • Total pages original book: 440
  • Includes a PDF summary of 36 pages
  • Duration of the summary (audio): 27M24S (7.2 MB)
  • Description or summary of the audiobook: Economics has much to do with incentives-not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the 'simple' situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract-the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits?Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
  • Other categories, genre or collection: Economic Theory & Philosophy
  • Download servers: FreakShare, Google Drive, Mediafire, LaciCloud, MyUpload, MEGA. Compressed in RAR, CPIO, TAR.LZO, CHM, RPM, ZIP, JAR
  • Format: Paperback
  • Approximate value: 43.14 USD
  • Dimensions: 177.55x253.75x28.96mm
  • Weight: 879g
  • Printed by: Not Available
  • Published in: New Jersey, United States

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